Reasoning in attitudes - École des Ponts ParisTech Accéder directement au contenu
Autre Publication Documents de travail du Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne Année : 2022

Reasoning in attitudes

Résumé

People reason not just in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on, often facing choices between rival between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (2013) and Dietrich et al. (2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes with or without facing such choices. Reasoning in attitudes is a mental activity that differs fundamentally from reasoning about attitudes, a form of theoretical reasoning by which one discovers rather than forms attitudes. Reasoning in attitudes has standard format features (such as monotonicity), but is indeterministic (reflecting choice in reasoning). Like theoretical reasoning, it need not follow logical entailment, but for different reasons related to indeterminism. This makes reasoning in attitudes harder to model logically than theoretical reasoning.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
22015RR.pdf (524.51 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

halshs-03023015 , version 1 (25-11-2020)
halshs-03023015 , version 2 (09-09-2021)
halshs-03023015 , version 3 (08-07-2022)

Licence

Paternité

Identifiants

  • HAL Id : halshs-03023015 , version 3

Citer

Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras. Reasoning in attitudes. 2022. ⟨halshs-03023015v3⟩
264 Consultations
173 Téléchargements

Partager

Gmail Facebook X LinkedIn More