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Journal Articles Social Choice and Welfare Year : 2020

On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules

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Economics and Finance
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Matias NUNEZ  : Connect in order to contact the contributor

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Submitted on : Friday, September 17, 2021-9:07:03 AM

Last modification on : Friday, May 5, 2023-2:46:57 PM

Long-term archiving on: Saturday, December 18, 2021-6:17:56 PM

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hal-03092402 , version 1 (17-09-2021)

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Matias Nunez, M. Remzi Sanver. On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, 56, pp.421-441. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01293-9⟩. ⟨hal-03092402⟩

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