Asymmetric impacts and over-provision of public goods - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année :

Asymmetric impacts and over-provision of public goods


We elicit simple conditions for an old puzzle -- over-provision of a public good. An asymmetric public good that benefits some contributors while harming others is subject to both free riding and free driving. Even though aggregate impacts are net positive, it can be over-provided if free drivers face provision costs that are sufficiently lower than free riders'. Asymmetric impacts further impose restrictions on Hicks-Kaldor improvements. We establish these results in a parsimonious model that can easily be applied to a variety of so-called NIMBY problems, for instance new public infrastructures and global warming mitigation.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
StaticVersion.pdf (715.89 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origine : Fichiers produits par l'(les) auteur(s)

Dates et versions

hal-01960318 , version 1 (19-12-2018)


  • HAL Id : hal-01960318 , version 1


Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet, Céline Guivarch. Asymmetric impacts and over-provision of public goods. 2018. ⟨hal-01960318⟩
100 Consultations
234 Téléchargements


Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More