Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence

Rabia Nessah (1) , M. Larbani (2) , T. Tazdaït (3)

1 LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221
2 Department of Business Administration, Faculty of Economics and Management Sciences, IIUM University Jalan Gombak, 53100 Kuala Lumpur
3 CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement

We introduce a solution concept for games in normal form with undetermined parameters, coalitional ZP-equilibrium, based on the notions of Z-equilibrium of [Zhukovskii and Chikrii [1994] Linear quadratic differential games, Kiev, Naoukova Doumka] and ZS-equilibrium of [Larbani and Lebbah [1999] A concept of equilibrium for a game under uncertainity. Europ. J. Oper. Res. 117, 145-156]. For each coalition structure, ZP-equilibrium ensures both the stability of the partition and equilibrium of coalitional strategies (in Pareto sense). We show that under some quasiconcavity conditions on payoff functions, the coalitional ZP-equilibrium exists in compact, convex and continuous normal form games involving undetermined parameters.

Domaines: Sciences de l'environnement; Economies et finances

Rabia Nessah, M. Larbani, T. Tazdaït. Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence. International Game Theory Review, 2015, 17 (3), ⟨10.1142/s0219198915500024⟩. ⟨hal-01239782⟩