HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES - Archive ouverte HAL Accéder directement au contenu
Article Dans Une Revue Economics and Philosophy Année : 2015

HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES

(1) , (2) , (3)
1
2
3

Résumé

Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.

Dates et versions

hal-01187848 , version 1 (27-08-2015)

Identifiants

Citer

P. Courtois, Rabia Nessah, Tarik Tazdaït. HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES. Economics and Philosophy, 2015, 31 (1), pp.123-139. ⟨10.1017/S026626711400042X⟩. ⟨hal-01187848⟩
160 Consultations
0 Téléchargements

Altmetric

Partager

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More