HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES

Abstract : Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.
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https://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01187848
Contributeur : Frédérique Bordignon <>
Soumis le : jeudi 27 août 2015 - 17:25:14
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 avril 2019 - 09:25:01

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P. Courtois, R. Nessah, T. Tazdaït. HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES. Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2015, 31 (1), pp.123-139. ⟨10.1017/s026626711400042x⟩. ⟨hal-01187848⟩

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