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Global carbon pricing and the “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”: the case of China

Abstract : This paper analyzes whether using carbon pricing as the major mitigation policy instrument is compatible with the implementation of the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle in a global climate agreement. We focus more specifically on China, a key player in climate negotiations. This is done by adopting the Imaclim-R model to assess the economic effect of carbon pricing on the Chinese economy in different climate architectures which, despite aiming at the same stabilization target, differ in terms of the temporal profile of emission reductions and the regional distribution of efforts (different quota allocation schemes). Model outcomes prove that neither temporal nor regional flexibilities provides a satisfactory answer since the Chinese economy remains significantly hurt at certain time periods. This suggests the recourse to complementary measures to carbon pricing in order to help smoothing the necessary shift toward a low-carbon society. This means in particular that, to build a climate policy architecture that could be compatible with the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle, climate negotiations must go beyond global top-down systems relying on cap-and-trade to include bottom-up measures likely to complement the carbon price and make carbon mitigation acceptable in countries like China. © 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Soumis le : jeudi 27 août 2015 - 16:18:08
Dernière modification le : vendredi 5 août 2022 - 14:38:11



M. Hamdi-Cherif, H. Waisman. Global carbon pricing and the “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities”: the case of China. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2015, ⟨10.1007/s10784-015-9289-2⟩. ⟨hal-01187770⟩



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