Accéder directement au contenu Accéder directement à la navigation
Article dans une revue

Complying with the Kyoto Protocol under uncertainty: Taxes or tradable permits?

Abstract : The Kyoto Protocol allocates tradable emission allowances (AAUs) to developed countries, but they are free to choose a set of policy instruments to comply with these targets. We compare two different policy instruments: a tax and purely domestic tradable permits, for the European Union, the US and Japan. Information on abatement costs and international permit price is imperfect and stems from nine global economic models. For a country party to the Protocol, the benefit of emission reduction is that it can sell more or has to buy less AAUs. We show that in this context, permits entail a slightly lower expected cost than a tax for the US and Japan, whereas both instruments yield an almost equal outcome for Europe. Applying Weitzman's framework (Prices vs. quantities, RES, 1974) in this context, we show the importance of the positive correlation between costs and benefits: technology shocks that lead to low abatement costs in one country generally lead to low abatement costs in other countries too, thereby leading to a low international permit price in the true-up period. © 2010 Elsevier Ltd.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Liste complète des métadonnées

https://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00755837
Contributeur : Ist Enpc <>
Soumis le : jeudi 22 novembre 2012 - 09:49:31
Dernière modification le : mercredi 14 octobre 2020 - 03:48:00

Lien texte intégral

Identifiants

Collections

Citation

Philippe Quirion. Complying with the Kyoto Protocol under uncertainty: Taxes or tradable permits?. Energy Policy, Elsevier, 2010, 38 (9), pp.51-66. ⟨10.1016/j.enpol.2010.04.054⟩. ⟨hal-00755837⟩

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

229