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Article dans une revue

A competitive fringe in the shadow of a state owned incumbent: The case of France

Abstract : We examine what kind of competitive fringe has been built in France around the State owned incumbent without destroying it or significantly weakening its dominant position; what impacts has this particular reform process on the market in which the incumbent monopolist is still overly dominant; and what more can be done to strengthen the opening of the market while staying in this typical French policy framework (no industrial restructuring and no forced divestiture by the monopolist). We wonder if a larger window of opportunity will open up at some later date for contesting the position of the monopolist, especially when investment in generation resumes. Copyright ©2005 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
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https://hal-enpc.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00716730
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Soumis le : mercredi 11 juillet 2012 - 10:51:19
Dernière modification le : mercredi 14 octobre 2020 - 04:15:52

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  • HAL Id : hal-00716730, version 1

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J.-M. Glachant, D. Finon. A competitive fringe in the shadow of a state owned incumbent: The case of France. Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, 2005, 26 (SPEC. ISS.), pp.181. ⟨hal-00716730⟩

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