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Climate agreement: Concesions and ratifications [Accord climatique Concessions et ratifications]

Abstract : We consider a bargaining game aiming at the full ratification of a climate treaty. Three distinct coalitions are considered: a pro-regime coalition, the so-called Kyoto group, an anti-regime coalition made of the countries rejecting the Kyoto protocol and the G77 coalition made of developing countries. We assume that the pro-regime coalition wants to ratify the treaty as uch while the two other coalitions condition ratification to further concesions. Employing an alternating offers model, we study the concession the pro-regime coalition should make for the others to acept ratify the treaty. We show that the more binding is the ratification constraint of the pro-regime coalition, the lowest is the concesion. Conversely, the more binding the ratification constraints of the two adverse coalitions, the highest should be the concession.
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Soumis le : mardi 10 juillet 2012 - 14:22:25
Dernière modification le : mardi 15 juin 2021 - 14:57:06


  • HAL Id : hal-00716360, version 1



P. Courtois, Tarik Tazdaït. Climate agreement: Concesions and ratifications [Accord climatique Concessions et ratifications]. Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2008, 59 (4), pp.719-735. ⟨hal-00716360⟩



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