Accéder directement au contenu Accéder directement à la navigation
Article dans une revue

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

Abstract : The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Liste complète des métadonnées
Contributeur : Ist Enpc Connectez-vous pour contacter le contributeur
Soumis le : mardi 10 juillet 2012 - 14:09:47
Dernière modification le : jeudi 21 octobre 2021 - 15:16:19

Lien texte intégral



A.M. Colman, T.W. Körner, O. Musy, T. Tazdaït. Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, Elsevier, 2011, 55 (2), pp.166-175. ⟨10.1016/⟩. ⟨hal-00716357⟩



Consultations de la notice